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A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged
with Misdemeanors Entitled to
Court Appointed Counsel?
B. Mitchell Simpson, III*
It is Monday morning in District Court. The docket is crowded
with a wide variety of matters-civil motions, citations, evictions,
civil trials and even small claims." After calling the calendar, the
sitting judge will do the arraignments, no matter how pressing any
civil matter may be. Those persons being arraigned will include
lockups (that is, anyone arrested by the police and held in custody)
and anyone else released from custody pending arraignment.
At an arraignment, the accused will be asked to enter a plea if
the offense is within the jurisdiction of the court (pleas for felonies
will be taken in the superior court).2 At this point, the judge has
the constitutional duty to explain to the accused the full panoply of
his rights under the law, particularly if the accused wishes to dis-
pose of the matter by pleading guilty or nolo contendere.3 In addi-
tion to a presumption of innocence, the accused has the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to confront witnesses,
to cross-examine them, to remain silent and to have the assistance
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I am grateful
to the Office of the Rhode Island Public Defender, and especially to Professor An-
drew Horwitz of the Roger Willliams University School of Law, who made avail-
able the numerous briefs, including those of amici curiae, submitted in this matter
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor
(Appointed Counsel), 666 A.2d 813 (R.I. 1995).
1. The description of matters before the District Court is based on Rhode
Island procedure. Other states may differ in some respects, but the point is illus-
trative rather than analytical.
2. This is the practice in Rhode Island; other states may differ.
3. In Rhode Island, nolo contendere is a statutory plea by which the accused
does not admit guilt. He or she only admits that the state has sufficient evidence
to convict him. See R.I. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 11.
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of counsel. 4 All of these rights are necessary to ensure that the
accused has a fair trial, which is at the heart of our jurisprudence.
The right to counsel is central to a fair trial. So long as an
accused has the means to hire a lawyer, there is no constitutional
problem. However, when the accused is an indigent and the offense
charged is a misdemeanor, a fair trial still requires that he be rep-
resented by counsel. The United States Supreme Court set the
minimum standard for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, ap-
plicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, when
it held in Scott v. Illinois5 that no indigent criminal defendant may
be sentenced to jail without the assistance of appointed counsel.6
Or, put another way, if an indigent charged with a misdemeanor is
not sentenced to jail, he has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Thirteen states have followed the holding of Scott.7
However, the vast majority of states (thirty-five and the Dis-
trict of Columbia) have left behind the minimal standards of Scott
and require the appointment of counsel for indigents charged with
misdemeanors punishable by incarceration, minimum jail
sentences or substantial fines. The breakdown is as follows:
twenty states and the District of Columbia have recognized that a
fair trial requires that indigents charged with any criminal offense
punishable by incarceration are entitled to appointed counsel, re-
gardless of whether a jail sentence follows conviction.8 Ten states
(and the federal courts) have adopted a compromise position by re-
quiring the appointment of counsel for indigents charged with mis-
4. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits the states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The development of constitu-
tional law in this area is an enormous and important topic, much of which is be-
yond the scope of this article.
5. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
6. See id. at 373.
7. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina
and Texas. Citations to cases and references to statutory and constitutional provi-
sions, as appropriate, are given respectively in a later portion of this article. See
infra notes 115-127.
8. These include: Alaska, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Case citations, statutory and constitutional
references, respectively, are given in a later portion of this article. See infra notes
78-98.
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demeanors, only if the sentence involves a minimum confinement,
usually six months or more.9 Three states require the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigents facing a substantial fine. 10 Two
states require the appointment of counsel where there is a "likeli-
hood of jail."" The rules for the appointment of counsel in the re-
maining two states are unclear.12
This seeming discrepancy between the requirements of the
federal constitution, as pronounced by the United States Supreme
Court, and the more liberal and expansive view of most of the
states, has caused confusion, most recently in Rhode Island.13 It
can be explained by a careful reading of the major decisions of the
United States Supreme Court on the subject and the case law and
statutes of the states.
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The seminal United States Supreme Court decision is Powell
v. Alabama.14 Nine black men-all of whom were young, illiterate,
ignorant and strangers to the county-were accused of raping two
white women on March 25, 1931.15 A sheriff's posse arrested them
the same day amidst great publicity and hostility. 16 The sheriff
was so concerned with the safeguarding of the prisoners that he
asked the state militia for assistance, which was provided until af-
ter the trial was concluded. 17 Indictments were returned on March
9. These states are: Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South Dakota. Citations to cases and statu-
tory and constitutional references, as appropriate, are listed in a later portion of
this article. See infra notes 99-108.
10. New Jersey, North Carolina and Vermont have such a rule. Citations to
cases and statutory and constitutional references, as appropriate, are listed in a
later portion of this article. See infra notes 110-12.
11. Kansas and Missouri have adopted this rule. Citations to cases and statu-
tory and constitutional references, as appropriate, are listed in a later portion of
this article. See infra notes 113-14.
12. Nevada and Utah do not appear to have explicitly adopted any of the posi-
tions discussed. Appropriate case, statutory and constitutional references appear
in a later portion of this article. See infra notes 128-29.
13. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Appointed Counsel), 666 A.2d
813 (R.I. 1995).
14. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15. See id. at 49.
16. See id. at 51.
17. See id.
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31; the accused were then promptly arraigned.' 8 The penalty
under the Alabama statute ranged from ten years imprisonment to
death.19
At the arraignment on March 31, they plead not guilty.20 How-
ever, the trial judge did not ask whether they had or were able to
employ counsel, whether they wished to have counsel appointed, or
whether they had friends or relatives who could assist them in ob-
taining counsel.21 Also, at the arraignment, the trial judge "ap-
pointed all the members of the bar for the purpose of arraigning
the defendants" with the expectation that they would continue "if
no counsel appear[ed." 22 None appeared.
On the very morning of the trial, no lawyer had been desig-
nated to represent the defendants.2 3 During the important period
between the arraignment and the start of the trial, when there
should have been thorough investigation, consultation and prepa-
ration, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel, although
they were entitled to it at that time as much as at the trial itself.24
This fact led the Supreme Court to hold that the "defendants were
not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense."25
The Supreme Court captured the atmosphere of the trial and
the casual nature of the appointment, or at least the entry of ap-
pearance of defense counsel, in these graphic terms:
The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by
hostile sentiment, haled back and forth under guard of
soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime regarded with espe-
cial horror in the community where they were to be tried,
were thus put in peril of their lives within a few moments
after counsel for the first time charged with any degree of re-
sponsibility began to represent them.26
The court then turned to the question whether the denial of assist-
ance of counsel was a denial of due process in contravention of the
18. See id. at 49.
19. See id. at 50.
20. See id. at 49-50.
21. See id. at 52.
22. Id. at 53.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 57.
25. Id. at 58.
26. Id. at 57-58.
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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.27 It
concluded that the aid of counsel is included in the concept of due
process, saying, "we think the failure of the trial court to give them
reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear de-
nial of due process."2s
The court reasoned that due process requires a hearing and
that fundamental to a hearing is the right to assistance of coun-
sel.29 Justice Sutherland's eloquent comment on this point has
been frequently quoted and bears repeating once again:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he
is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules
of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompe-
tent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and kntwledge ade-
quately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If, in any case, civil
or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse
to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal
would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process
in the constitutional sense.30
The reasoning of the court is clear and uncomplicated: due process
requires a hearing. At a hearing, a defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel. The right to due process, which includes the
right to counsel, "is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and jus-
tice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
27. See id. at 60.
28. Id. at 71.
29. See id. at 68.
30. Id. at 68-69.
2000]
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tions."' 31 The court focused on the conduct of the hearing in
making its determination of due process and not on the sentence.
The fact that the defendants had been sentenced to death made the
stakes higher, but did not intrude upon the necessity of a hearing
and the defendants' constitutional right to assistance of counsel
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Construed narrowly, Powell stands for the proposition that, in
capital cases, an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to
counsel, which the state must provide. What about an indigent
charged with a non-capital felony? Clarence Gideon was charged
in a Florida state court with breaking and entering a poolroom
with intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under Florida
law.3 2 At his trial, he requested the court to appoint defense coun-
sel. 3 3 The court refused on grounds that Florida law authorized
the appointment of counsel only in capital cases.3 4 Gideon under-
took his own defense and was convicted anyway.35 He was sen-
tenced to five years imprisonment.36 He filed a habeas corpus
petition attacking his conviction on grounds that he had been de-
nied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. 37
Justice Black, writing for seven members of the Supreme
Court, reaffirmed the principal that "those guarantees of the Bill of
Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from
federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."S3 He con-
cluded, "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a law-
yer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth."39 The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the Flor-
ida courts.40
Following Powell by a generation, Gideon is not only a reaffir-
mation of the holding of Powell, but it also follows the same line of
31. Id. at 67 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
32. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1963).





38. Id. at 341.
39. Id. at 344.
40. See id. at 345.
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reasoning by addressing the question of what is essential to a fair
trial. Both cases are well-reasoned. Both cases make it abun-
dantly clear that assistance of counsel is fundamental to a fair
trial. Both cases have settled the question that indigents charged
with capital or non-capital felonies are entitled to the assistance of
counsel.
What about misdemeanors? Jon Argersinger was charged in a
Florida state court with carrying a concealed deadly weapon, an
offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months and a fine of
$1,000. 4 1 He was not represented by counsel at his trial.42 He was
convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail.4 3 He insti-
tuted habeas corpus proceedings, but the Florida Supreme Court
denied relief on grounds that the right to counsel extended only to
trials for non-petty offenses which were punishable by more than
six months imprisonment. 44 He prevailed in the Supreme Court in
1972, where it was held that no person may be imprisoned for any
offense unless he was represented by counsel at trial.45
The Argersinger court followed the same rationale of the Pow-
ell and Gideon courts by concentrating on the question: what is
necessary for a fair trial? Justice Douglas pointed out that both
Powell and Gideon were charged with felonies, but Argersinger
had been charged with a misdemeanor. 46 The common rationale of
the Powell and Gideon cases is equally relevant "to any criminal
trial, where an accused is deprived of his liberty."47 The court con-
cluded that "the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty
offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused
a fair trial."48
Rather than simply reaffirming the principal that assistance
of counsel is a prerequisite of a fair trial, the court's holding mud-
died the waters: "[wie hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
41. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26 (1972).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 26-27.
45. See id. at 40.
46. See id. at 32.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 36-37 (footnote omitted).
2000]
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represented by counsel at his trial."49 Tying Argersinger's right to
counsel to his sentence was not necessary to reverse his conviction.
The Supreme Court could simply have said, in effect, that a fair
trial, even for a misdemeanor, requires the assistance of counsel,
unless there is an intelligent and knowing waiver. This holding
has blurred the clear purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel: to insure a fair trial for the accused, regardless of the na-
ture of the offense charged and its penalty. Instead, and unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court focused on the result of the trial and the
sentence imposed.
Seven years after Argersinger, the Supreme Court again took
up the question of an indigent defendant's right to counsel in Scott
v. Illinois.50 Aubrey Scott, an indigent, was convicted of shoplift-
ing and was fined $50-but not sentenced to jail-after a bench
trial in an Illinois state court.51 Under the applicable Illinois stat-
ute, the maximum sentence was a $500 fine and one year in jail, or
both.52 The Supreme Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not require a state to appoint counsel for an indi-
gent who is charged with a statutory offense for which jail is au-
thorized but not imposed. 53 In other words, the Scott court held,
regardless of the authorized punishment, no indigent may be sen-
tenced to jail if he has not been represented by counsel. 54
Once again, and more forcefully this time, the Supreme Court
emphasized the penalty imposed rather than the fairness of the
trial preceding imposition of the penalty. In so doing, it turned the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel on its head. Powell may have
involved a capital offense, but the underlying theory of Justice
Sutherland's opinion was the absolute necessity of ensuring a fair
trial for indigents. The Scott court turned its back on this enlight-
ened approach.
The reasoning of Justice Rehnquist is often overlooked in the
justified criticisms of his opinion. 55 He noted the difficulty of con-
stitutional line drawing, "as the reach of the Constitution is ex-
49. Id. at 37.
50. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
51. See id. at 368.
52. See id. (foonote omitted).
53. See id. at 373-74.
54. See id. at 374.
55. For an excellent commentary on Scott, see The Supreme Court, 1978 Term,
93 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 82-88 (1979),
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tended further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from one
area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to another."56 He further
commented that "[tihe range of human conduct regulated by state
criminal laws is much broader than that of the federal criminal
laws, particularly on the 'petty' offense part of the spectrum."57
The clear inference is that federal jurisprudence should not in-
trude unnecessarily into the areas of human conduct more prop-
erly regulated by the states. The logical conclusion is that it is the
responsibility of the states to ensure that indigents charged with
misdemeanors receive a fair trial, regardless of what penalties
may be authorized or actually imposed.
II. THE STATES AND THE RIGHT To COUNSEL
The right to counsel is firmly embedded in American jurispru-
dence. How the states have provided-or failed to provide-coun-
sel for indigents charged with misdemeanors is a legal patchwork.
No state denies the right to counsel for people accused of crimes.
Generally speaking, the states have included the right to counsel
in their constitutions and most states make some provision for it
by statute or by court rule as well.
The reason for the inclusion of a right to counsel in the Bill of
Rights and in state constitutions lies in the English common law.
Originally, under the common law, a person accused of treason or a
felony was not entitled to counsel (procured and paid by the ac-
cused), except for the determination of legal questions which the
accused might raise. "The rule was constantly, vigorously and
sometimes passionately assailed by English statesmen and law-
yers," among them Blackstone in his Commentaries.58 By the time
of the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, twelve of the thirteen
colonies had definitely rejected the English rule and instead, had
recognized the right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions, save
that in one or two instances the right was limited to capital of-
fenses or to the more serious crimes. ....- 59
The intent of the framers of the Bill of Rights in 1795 was
clearly to abrogate this perverse English common law rule by con-
stitutional amendment and to provide the defendant with the right
56. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372.
57. Id.
58. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932).
59. Id. at 64-65.
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to be represented by counsel, presumably of his own choice and at
his own expense. The states followed suit with similar constitu-
tional guarantees of counsel in "criminal prosecutions" and even in
"all criminal prosecutions."60
Nevertheless, there is a wide disparity among the states as to
whether indigents charged with misdemeanors are entitled to ap-
pointed counsel. The range is extreme. South Carolina has a con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing right to counsel, 61 but limits it
by statute to those instances required by the United States Consti-
tution,62 which means South Carolina adheres to Scott and
Argersinger. This view is shared by only twelve other states.6 3
The majority of the states-36 in all-have expanded the right
to counsel for indigents charged with misdemeanors. 64 These
states have clearly reserved the power to develop additional consti-
tutional or statutory rights. Although most states have not said as
much through their supreme courts, a few states, such as Alaska,
not only reserve, but also proclaim the right to develop additional
constitutional rights and privileges under their respective consti-
tutions "if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be
within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional language
and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty
which is at the core of our constitutional heritage."65
The readiness of the state courts to expand rights beyond the
minimal limits established by Scott, is best expressed by the Ver-
mont Supreme Court's metaphor that the Vermont constitution is
"freestanding," and may require a closer examination of the issues
than is required under the Fourteenth Amendment.66
60. Id. at 61-64.
61. See S.C. Const. art. I, § 14.
62. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
63. See supra note 7 for a list of states adhering to the minority view.
64. See supra notes 8-12 for a list of states that have expanded the right to
counsel for indigents charged with misdemeanors.
65. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970). See also
Alaska Const. art. I, § 11 (guaranteeing right of accused to counsel); Resek v.
State, 706 P.2d 288, 291 n.11 (Alaska 1985) (holding that "[t]he right to counsel
under the Alaska Constitution is more expansive than the corresponding right
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution").
66. Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 599 A.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Vt. 1991). Although this
case dealt with issues relating to workers' compensation, the willingness of the
Vermont Supreme Court to act independently and according to its own notions of
the law is important.
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Several states have made it abundantly clear that their citi-
zens enjoy broader rights under their respective state constitutions
than they do under the United States Constitution. Minnesota has
established "a broad-based right to counsel which goes beyond the
dictates of Scott v. Illinois .... -67 The Indiana Supreme Court re-
versed a misdemeanor conviction after the trial court failed to in-
form the accused of his right to counsel pursuant to the Indiana
state constitution.6 s
Washington, 69 Oregon,70 Illinois71 and New Hampshire72 have
also taken stands based explicitly on the rights guaranteed by
their respective state constitutions, which are significantly broader
than the holdings of Scott and Argersinger.
It is ironic that while the United States Supreme Court in
Argersinger and Scott has limited the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to those instances where a jail sentence is actually im-
posed, the right to counsel has been expanded in the District of
Columbia to apply in all cases where an accused faces a loss of
liberty upon conviction.73 In construing the Criminal Justice Act,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that Congress
did not intend that "the right to counsel should depend on the sen-
tence eventually imposed by the trial judge, or that the judge
67. State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. 1983). The Minnesota
Constitution provides: "[in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to... have the assistance of counsel in his defense." Minn. Const. art I, § 6.
68. See Brunson v. State, 394 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The Indi-
ana Constitution provides: "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right... to be heard by himself and counsel...." Ind. Const. art. I, § 13. After
conviction of a misdemeanor, Brunson was sentenced to pay a fine and to a jail
term. See Brunson, 394 N.E.2d at 230. This case was decided seven years after
Argersinger (1972) and six months after Scott (1979). The point still remains that
the Indiana Supreme Court looked to the state constitution to ascertain Brunson's
rights.
69. See Wash. Const. art. I, § 22; Wash. Ct. R. Crim. P. 3.1(a), (d); State v.
Fitzsimmons, 620 P.2d 999 (Wash. 1980).
70. See Or. Const. art. I, § 11; Gaffey v. State, 637 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Or. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that Oregon law is broader than Argersinger and that the right
to counsel attaches in all criminal prosecutions).
71. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 2; People v. Dass, 589 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (specifically holding that the right to counsel in Illinois "is broader than
the constitutional right as defined by Scott and Argersinger"). The right to counsel
is guaranteed under the theory of due process. See People v. McCauley, 645
N.E.2d 923, 937 (Ill. 1994).
72. See N.H. Const. part I, art. XV; State v. Scarborough, 470 A.2d 909 (N.H.
1983).
73. See D.C. Code Ann. § 11-2602 (1981).
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should be permitted to dispense with providing legal representa-
tion for a poor defendant after the fact, by not sentencing him to
prison."74
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the under-
lying purpose of the right to counsel under the state constitution is
to enable "an accused to procure a fair trial."75 The North Dakota
court also repudiated an explanatory note to the state rules of
criminal procedure, which indicated the rules expressly followed
Argersinger, by saying, "in North Dakota the right to counsel.. . is
[not] to be limited by or to the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court."76
III. THE MAJORITY VIEW
The majority of American jurisdictions-thirty-five states and
the District of Columbia-have rejected the minimal standards es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Argersinger and Scott and have
expanded the right to counsel for indigents charged with misde-
meanors. This expansion has not been uniform and varies sub-
stantially from one jurisdiction to another. Unfortunately, the
criteria for appointment of counsel in the majority of jurisdictions
relate to the imposition of punishment, rather than to the guaran-
tee of a fair trial. The purpose for appointing counsel is to ensure a
fair trial and, for this reason, the right to counsel is fundamental to
the concept of due process.
The various criteria used by the majority of jurisdictions falls
into four main categories.
1. When the Offense is Punishable by a Jail Sentence
Twenty states and the District of Columbia will appoint coun-
sel for indigents charged with misdemeanors, if a jail sentence is
authorized upon conviction. Generally speaking, the underlying
notion is a literal interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
right of counsel in "all criminal prosecutions."7 7 Those that follow
74. Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78, 85 (D.C. 1988) (footnote
omitted).
75. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178 (N.D. 1985) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
76. Id. at 178 n.6.
77. Supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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the aforementioned procedure include: Alaska, 78 California, 79 Del-
aware,80 District of Columbia, 8 ' Illinois,8 2 Indiana,8 3 Kentucky,84
Louisiana,8 5 Massachusetts, 86 Minnesota,8 7  Nebraska,88  New
78. See Alaska Const. art. 1, § 11; Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374, 378 (Alaska
1976) (holding that the Alaska Constitution guarantees the right to appointed
counsel, even when the charge is a misdemeanor); Alexander v. City of Anchorage,
490 P.2d 910, 915-16 (Alaska 1971) (holding that an indigent defendant is entitled
to representation by counsel when prosecuted for an offense in which the penalty
may be incarceration, loss of a valuable license or a fine that indicates criminality);
Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d 528, 531-32 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (emphasizing the
overriding importance of fairness in appointing counsel for an indigent charged
with a misdemeanor).
79. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 15; Cal. Penal Code § 686 (West 1985); Tracy v.
Municipal Ct,, 587 P.2d 227 (Cal. 1978) (stating that indigent defendants charged
with possession of less than an ounce of marijuana were entitled to assistance of
appointed counsel); Mills v. Municipal Ct., 515 P.2d 273, 282 (Cal. 1973) (explain-
ing why the right to appointed counsel for indigent clients who have been charged
with a misdemeanor should not be limited to those cases where there is the possi-
bility of jail time).
80. See Del. Const. art. I, § 7; Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 4602 (1997); Del. Super.
Ct. R. Crim. P. 44; Del. Common Pleas R. Crim. P. 44(a); Del. Justice of the Peace
R. Crim. P. 44.
81. See D.C. Code Ann. § 11-2602 (1981); Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548
A.2d 78 (D.C. 1988).
82. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 2; People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923 (Ill. 1994);
People v. Dass, 589 N.E.2d 1065, 1067-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that a de-
fendant sentenced to "supervision" is entitled to appointed counsel); People v.
Morgese, 418 N.E.2d 1124, 1128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that a defendant sen-
tenced to probation is entitled to counsel).
83. See Ind. Const. art. I, § 13; Brunson v. State, 394 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979).
84, See Ky. Const. art. I, § 11; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31.100(1), (4)(b) (Michie
1998).
85. See La. Const. art. I, § 13; State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993); State v.
Fraychineaud, 620 So.2d 338 (La. App. Ct. 1993).
86. See Mass. Const. part I, art. XII; Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:10 (proscribing
the terms and conditions required in the process of assigning counsel to indigents);
MacDonnel v. Commonwealth, 230 N.E.2d 821 (Mass. 1967) (holding the right to
appointed counsel for indigents in Massachusetts stems from the court rule and
not the Massachusetts Constitution).
87. See Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.01(b), 5.02(2) (defining the
terms and conditions required in the process of assigning counsel to indigents);
State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1983) (indicating that the Minnesota
Constitution and the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require a defendant,
if indigent, be informed of his right to counsel and his right to have counsel ap-
pointed); State v. Ferris, 540 N.W.2d 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that,
although not indigent under the standards of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a defendant may obtain court appointed counsel if retaining private
counsel would create substantial hardship).
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Hampshire,8 9 New York, 90 Oklahoma, 91 Oregon,9 2 Tennessee, 93
Virginia,94 Washington,95 West Virginia, 96 Wisconsin 97 and Wyo-
88. See Neb. Const. art. I, § 11; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3902 (1995) (proscribing
rules and procedures for determining necessity of court appointed counsel); State
v. Green, 471 N.W.2d 402 (Neb. 1991) (holding that defendant knowingly, intelli-
gently and voluntarily waived the right to counsel); State v. Sondag, 335 N.W.2d
306 (Neb. 1983) (holding that, without a knowing and intelligent waiver, a defend-
ant cannot be imprisoned if he was not represented at trial, without a determina-
tion of his ability or desire to retain counsel).
89. See N.H. Const. part I, art. XV; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:2 (Supp
1999) (explaining the qualifications for adequate representation of counsel for indi-
gent defendants in criminal cases); State v. Scarborough, 470 A.2d 909 (N.H. 1983)
(holding that a defendant's right to counsel under the New Hampshire Constitu-
tion covers a broader range of criminal defendants than such right granted by the
6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution).
90. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.10(3)(c) (McKinney 1993); People v. Ross,
493 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1986) (holding that a defendant who expressed reservations re-
garding continuing pro se, and was not subject to imprisonment for a misdemeanor
conviction, was entitled to affirmative action by the court to effectuate his right to
counsel).
91. See Okla. Const. art. II, § 20; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1358 (West Supp.
2000) (dictating the process for appointing counsel to all indigents); Stewart v.
State, 495 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (holding that defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and, therefore, defendant's prior con-
viction was not unconstitutional); Hunter v. State, 288 P.2d 425 (Okla. Crim. App.
1955) (upholding prior conviction where the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel).
92. See Or. Const. art. I, § 11; Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.050(4) (Supp. 111 1998) (in-
dicating the criteria needing to be successfully met in order to obtain court ap-
pointed counsel); Gaffey v. State, 637 P.2d 634 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
traffic crimes were not an exception to the Oregon constitutional provision that all
indigents were entitled to counsel for criminal prosecutions).
93. See Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; Allen v. McWilliams, 715 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn.
1986) (striking in its entirety Rule 13 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee and re-
vising it to include compensation for court appointed counsel).
94. The Virginia Constitution is silent on the right to counsel. Prior to
Argersinger, indigents had no right to appointed counsel. See Andrew P. Miller &
Vann H. Lefroe, Gideon's Encore: The Argersinger Decision in Virginia, 30 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 431, 443 (1973). However, the Code of Virginia now provides that if
a charge "involves incarceration," the trial judge must ascertain if the accused
wishes to waive counsel and, if not, the judge will make a determination of indi-
gence. See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-160 (Michie 1995); Harris v. Commonwealth, 455
S.E.2d 759 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that absent a knowing waiver, an unconsti-
tutional conviction may not stand); Griswold v. Commonwealth, 453 S.E.2d 287
(Va. Ct. App. 1995) (same).
95. See Wash. Const. art. I, § 22; Wash. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 3.1(a), (d); State
v. Fitzsimmons, 620 P.2d 999 (Wash. 1980). But see State v. Lang, 705 P.2d 245
(Wash. 1985) (holding that no constitutional or statutory provision exists requiring
a defendant charged only with negligent driving be provided court appointed
counsel).
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ming.98 With the exception of Illinois, the other state constitutions
provide for a right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, which has
been implemented either by statute, rule of court or case law.
2. When the Offense is Punishable by a Jail Sentence Above a
Specified Minimum Term
Ten states have taken a slightly more restrictive approach by
requiring appointment of counsel for indigents charged with mis-
demeanors only if a jail sentence exceeds a certain minimum. The
underlying rationale in most of these jurisdictions is based on the
distinction between misdemeanors and petty offenses, and historic
reluctance to appoint counsel to defend indigents when charged
with petty offenses. These jurisdictions are: Idaho, 99 Iowa, 100
Maine,' 0 1 Maryland,10 2 Michigan, 10 3 New Mexico,' 0 4 Ohio, 0 5
96. See W. Va. Const. art. III, § 14; W. Va. Code § 50-4-3 (1994); Bullett v.
Staggs, 250 S.E.2d 38 (W. Va. 1978).
97. See Wis. Const. art. I, § 7; Wisconsin ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 249 N.W.2d
791 (Wis. 1977).
98. See Wyo. Const. art. I, § 10; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104 (Michie 1999).
99. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; Idaho Code §§ 19-851(d)(2), 19-852(a)(1)
(1997); State v. Hardman, 818 P.2d 782 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (indicating indigent
defendant entitled to appointed counsel for any misdemeanor which includes the
possibility of imprisonment for more than six months).
100. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 10; Iowa R. Crim. P. 26; State v. Watts, 186
NW.2d 611 (Iowa 1971) (citing Wright v. Denato, 178 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1970))
(stating indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel when indicted for a
misdemeanor carrying a potential sentence of more than thirty days
imprisonment).
101. See Me. Const. art. I, § 6; State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671 (Me. 1984) (discuss-
ing the holding of Newell v. State, 277 A.2d 731 (Me. 1971), that an indigent de-
fendant is not entitled to appointed counsel for "petty offenses," but is entitled to
appointed counsel for "serious misdemeanors," i.e., offenses with a potential of six
months or more of jail time).
102. See Md. Declaration of Rights, art. XXI; Md. Ann. Code art. 27A, § 4(b)
(1997); State v. Bryan, 395 A.2d 475 (Md. 1978) (holding that a defendant must
have the assistance of counsel unless waived by him).
103. See Mich. Const. art. I, § 20; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 763.1 (West 1982);
People v. Harris, 206 N.W.2d 478 (Mich. 1973). See also Mich. Ct. R. 6.610(D)
(indicating an indigent defendant entitled to appointed counsel if conviction of
charged misdemeanor is punishable by more than ninety-two days imprisonment).
104. See N.M. Const. art. II, § 14; N.M. Stat. Ann § 31-16-3 (Michie 1984) (ar-
ticulating that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel, if conviction
of a misdemeanor carries a possible sentence of six months confinement or more);
43 Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 2 (1987). ("requiring that no indigent criminal, whether ac-
cused of a felony or a misdemeanor, may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
unless the state has afforded the accused the right to assistance of appointed
counsel").
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Pennsylvania, 10 6 Rhode Island, 10 7 South Dakota' 08 and the federal
courts.' 0 9
3. When the Offense is Punishable by a Substantial Fine
Three states require the appointment of counsel for indigents
when, in addition to imprisonment, a substantial fine or "conse-
quences of magnitude" could result. They are: New Jersey, 110
North Carolina"' and Vermont. 112
105. See Ohio Const. art. I, § 10; Ohio R. Crim. P. 44(A) (requiring assignment
of counsel to defendant charged with "serious offenses," i.e., punishable by more
than six months jail time); Ohio R. Crim. P. 44(B) (prohibiting sentencing to jail of
defendants convicted of petty offenses without representation of counsel or a know-
ing waiver).
106. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 9; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 106(c)(2) (West 1992)
(defining a summary offense as one with a maximum of ninety days jail time); Pa.
R. Crim. P. 316(a) (requiring assignment of counsel for indigents in all summary
cases without any of the qualifications in Scott). The comment to Rule 316 ex-
plains that it is intended to implement the Argersinger decision, but the language
of the rule is much broader. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 316 cmt.
107. See R.I. Const. art. I, § 10; State v. Moretti, 521 A.2d 1003 (R.I. 1987) (dis-
cussing that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel if the charge is
punishable by more than six months jail time); State v. Holliday, 280 A.2d 333
(R.I. 1971). But see In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813, 817 (R.I.
1995) (indicating that the Holliday holding should be revisited and the state con-
stitution should be interpreted "in a manner consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Scott"). Although an
advisory opinion is not precedential, it does give an indication of the thinking of
the individual justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and may presage
Rhode Island's departure from the majority view in a future case.
108. See S.D. Const. art. VI, § 7; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-6-2, 23A-40-61, 23A-
40-6.1 (Michie 1998). (If the defendant requests, the court shall appoint counsel
for any offense carrying a penalty of more than thirty days imprisonment. How-
ever, if the judge states on the record that jail time will not be imposed, the defend-
ant has no right to appointed counsel.)
109. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(a), (b), 3559(a)(6) (West 1999) (describing that an
indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel for any offense with a penalty
of more than six months imprisonment),
110. See N.J. Const. art. I, § 10; Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223
(N.J. 1971) (holding that counsel must be appointed for indigents when conviction
"entail[s] imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude"); State v.
Hermanns, 650 A.2d 360 (N.J. Super. 1994) (overturning a municipal court convic-
tion of numerous ordinance violations and a fine totalling $1,800 because an indi-
gent defendant was denied counsel).
111. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 23; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(a)(1) (1999) (holding
that, among other things, an indigent is entitled to counsel if conviction carries a
penalty or imprisonment with a fine of $500 or more); State v. Speights, 182 S.E.2d
204 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that there is no right to appointed counsel for
petty offenses).
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4. When There is a Likelihood of Jail
In Kansas l13 and Missouri,'114 an indigent charged with a mis-
demeanor is entitled to appointed counsel if there is a likelihood of
a jail sentence upon conviction.
IV. THE MINORITY: ARGERSINGER AND SCOTrr JURISDICTIONS
The states that so far have failed to expand the right to coun-
sel for indigents charged with misdemeanors beyond the admitted
minimum standards established in Scott and Argersinger are: Ala-
bama, 1 15 Arizona, 116 Arkansas, 117 Colorado," l8 Connecticut," 9
112. See Vt. Const. art. I, § 10; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5201 (1998) (requiring
the appointment of counsel for an indigent charged with a misdemeanor carrying a
penalty involving a fine of more than $1,000 "or any period of imprisonment" un-
less the judge states he will not impose jail time).
113. See Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 9; Kan. Stat. Ann. §12-4405 (1991) (requir-
ing municipal court judges to appoint counsel for indigents charged with ordinance
violations when the municipal judge "has reason to believe that if found guilty, the
accused person might be deprived of his or her liberty); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4503
(1995) (requiring appointment of counsel for indigents charged with felonies); Kan-
sas ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987) (dictating that the state
must provide counsel for indigents charged with misdemeanors "when imprison-
ment is a real possibility").
114. See Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(a); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 600.042 (West 1999) (re-
quiring appointment of counsel for indigents charged with a misdemeanor "which
will probably result in confinement in the county jail upon conviction").
115. See Ala. Const. art. I, § 6; Ala. R. Crim. P. 6.1(a) (stating that an indigent
is entitled to appointment of attorney "in all criminal proceedings in which repre-
sentation by counsel is constitutionally required"); Reese v. State, 620 So.2d 579,
580 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases applies
"only when the defendant is actually sentenced to jail") (citations omitted).
116. See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.1(b) (stating that "[ain
indigent defendant shall be entitled to have an attorney appointed.., in any crim-
inal proceeding which may result in punishment by loss of liberty. . . "); Campa v.
Fleming, 656 P.2d 619 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (following Scott on grounds that there
is no authority holding that Arizona standards are more strict than those required
by the U.S. Constitution).
117. See Ark. Const. art. II, § 10; Ark. R. Crim. P. 8.2(b).
118. See Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-103 (West 1999)
(requiring the public defender to represent indigents, unless the prosecutor states
in writing that he will not seek jail time upon conviction).
119. See Conn. Const. art. I, § 8; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 51-296, 54-1b (West
Supp. 1999); State v. Florence, 178 A.2d 862, 863 (Conn. 1961) (holding that a
defendant charged with a misdemeanor is not entitled to be advised of the right to
counsel, or even entitled to have counsel, at arraignment). Florence seems to be
good law. No later decisions have explained or expanded the right to counsel.
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Florida, 120 Georgia, 121 Hawaii, 122 Mississippi, 123 Montana, 124
North Dakota,125 South Carolina 126 and Texas.127 The constitu-
tions of these states contain provisions guaranteeing the right to
counsel in criminal prosecutions. Despite these constitutional pro-
visions, these few states have simply failed to expand the right to
counsel. This failure is not the result of an arbitrary or authorita-
rian bent of their supreme courts or legislatures. It rests, for bet-
ter or for worse, on a reliance on the United States Supreme Court
to pronounce the extent of constitutional rights and nothing more.
120. See Fla. Const. art. I, § 16; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(b)(1) (stating that ap-
pointment of counsel for an indigent charged with a misdemeanor is not required if
the judge states in writing that he will not award jail time upon conviction).
121. See Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, xiv; Brawner v. State, 296 S.E.2d 551, 552 (Ga.
1982) (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972)); Peters v. State, 435 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (specifically adopt-
ing the Scott rule).
122. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 14; State v. Apuna, 657 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1983) (specifically adopting the Scott rule).
123. See Miss. Const. art. III, § 26; Miss. Code Ann. § 25-32-9 (1999) (prohibit-
ing the imprisonment of an indigent "unless he was represented by the public de-
fender or waived the right to counsel").
124. See Mont. Const. art. II, § 24; City of Billings v. Layzell, 789 P.2d 221, 225
(Mont. 1990) (citing Scott as controlling authority).
125. See N.D. Const. art. I, § 12; N.D. R. Crim. P. 44 (requiring appointment of
counsel for indigents charged with misdemeanors, unless "the magistrate has de-
termined that sentence upon conviction will not include imprisonment"). But,
State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985), held that a court must appoint counsel
for an indigent charged with DUI "if enhancement punishment for a subsequent
conviction is not to be precluded." Id. at 179. The court in Orr also stated that the
explanatory note to Rule 44, which states that counsel will be appointed "only
when required under the holding ... in Argersinger . . . [does not] indicate any
intention that in North Dakota the right to counsel guaranteed by [the North Da-
kota Constitution] is to be limited by holdings of the United States Supreme
Court." Id. at 178 n.6.
126. See S.C. Const. art. I, § 14; S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(noting that indigent defendants will be provided with counsel when required by
the U.S. Constitution).
127. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 10; Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 26.04 (West 1989)
(requiring the court to appoint defense counsel when it "determines that a defend-
ant charged with a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment is indi-
gent"); Fortner v. State, 764 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (The prosecutor
stated he would not seek jail time. The defendant's request for counsel was there-
after denied; he appeared pro se and was convicted. The appellate court upheld the
conviction on grounds that there was no requirement under Scott and Argersinger
to appoint counsel.) (citing Scott, 440 U.S. 367; Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25); Empy v.
State, 571 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (noting that only a fine was actually
imposed, although the statute authorized imprisonment; nevertheless, the court
held the defendant was not entitled to counsel).
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V. THE UNDECIDEDS
Nevada 128 and Utah 129 do not have clearly established
positions.
VI. PROBLEMS WITH SCOYT
The problems with Scott are both practical and analytical. The
chief practical problem with the application of the Scott rule (that
an indigent charged with a misdemeanor may not be sentenced to
jail without representation by counsel) is that it requires the trial
judge to determine in advance of trial what the sentence will be in
the event of conviction. The practical problems in making this de-
termination are enormous. How does the trial judge make such a
determination: by a hearing in open court, in the presence of the
defendant, at which, the prosecutor, or even a representative of the
police department, recites the evidence that will be introduced and
possibly makes a recommendation? By an in camera conference
with the prosecutor and the police? At arraignment, for the pur-
pose of encouraging a guilty or nolo contendere plea, so as to dis-
pose of another matter on an already over-crowded calendar?
The Scott rule binds a judge before all of the evidence has been
presented. A trial judge who had previously determined that the
sentence upon conviction would not include jail time, may not
change his mind and sentence an uncounseled defendant to jail, no
matter how much the evidence warrants it. The determination of a
sentence should follow a trial, not precede it.
Scott also creates other practical problems. For example, at
arraignment, the judge may determine under Scott that it is a
"non-jail" case. If the defendant cannot make bail, he will be held
in custody until his trial a few days or even weeks later. After
128. See Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.188 (1997) (providing that
any defendant charged with an offense, including a misdemeanor, may request
counsel and that the court shall appoint counsel if it "[o]therwise determines that
representation is required"). Case law does not clarify Nevada's statutory
requirement.
129. See Utah Const. art. I, § 12; Utah R. Crim. P. 7(d)(3) (requiring the magis-
trate to inform the defendant of the right to counsel). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 8
(providing that an indigent defendant "has the right to court-appointed counsel if
the defendant faces a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty"); Webster v.
Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978) (holding that where a person is charged with
an offense which may be punished by imprisonment, he is entitled to the assist-
ance of counsel) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25).
20001 435
436 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:417
trial, the judge may sentence him to time served as a common-
sense disposition, particularly because the defendant lacks the
means to pay a fine. But the retrospective nature of "time served,"
makes the failure to appoint counsel unlawful under Scott, and
hence a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 130 Scott, in effect, vitiates "time served" sentences, unless
the trial court at arraignment and in an abundance of caution ap-
points counsel for indigents when bail is set. If so, there is very
little left to Scott in the practical judicial world of the district court,
because counsel will be appointed for indigents when bail is set
and the trial judge will have flexibility in sentencing.
When the issue was raised before the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in 1995, the Office of the Public Defender pointed out that
Scott creates "a labyrinthine prospect of a defendant going in and
out of the right to counsel." A defendant is arrested on a misde-
meanor charge of possession of marijuana. Suspected of being part
of a drug ring, he or she is questioned, and invokes a Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 31 The
right to counsel has attached.
The defendant is then charged with misdemeanor possession
and the judge, at arrangement, predetermines that the case is
"non-jail." The right to counsel vanishes. Three days later, a BCI
(Background Criminal Investigation) check reveals an apparent
earlier offense and the charge is amended to second-degree posses-
sion. The judge then determines that jail may be appropriate and
the right to counsel re-attaches. At pretrial, where the defendant is
represented by counsel, it is revealed that the earlier possession
charge was filed on a not guilty plea and the charge is dropped
back to simple possession. When the likelihood of jail vanishes,
counsel does too.' 32
As difficult as these practical problems may be, perhaps some
modus vivendi could be devised to get around them, no matter how
cumbersome and how difficult for the practitioner in court and for
the trial judge. Nevertheless, using the "authorized penalty" test
130. See "Brief in Chief of the Office of Public Defender as Amicus Curiae,"
Rhode Island Supreme Court, In re: Advisory Opinion to the Governor, No. 95-265
MP, at 39.
131. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
132. See supra note 130, at 43-44.
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would eliminate these practical difficulties and broaden a funda-
mental constitutional right as well.
The chief problem with Scott, and its fatal flaw, is that it
places emphasis on the sentence eventually imposed, rather than
on the conduct of the trial. The essence of due process is judicial
fairness. The right to counsel was enshrined in the Bill of Rights
and in state constitutions to insure that defendants were, in fact,
accorded a fair trial.
A misdemeanor trial is no less important than a trial for a fel-
ony. In both trials the prosecution bears the burden of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt; the defendant enjoys a presumption of
innocence; evidence must be in accord with the rules of evidence;
proper procedure must be followed; the findings of the court must
constitute an offense; and, if there is a finding of guilty, the sen-
tence must be lawful.
Trial of a misdemeanor is not necessarily a simple matter. It
can involve serious First Amendment questions in disorderly con-
duct, obstruction, trespass and disturbing the peace charges. Driv-
ing while intoxicated necessarily involves expert testimony about
breathalyzers and calibration of equipment. Simple assault may
raise questions of self-defense. Possession of marijuana frequently
raises Fourth Amendment questions. The list goes on.133
The main difference between a felony and a misdemeanor is
the severity of the sentence the court may impose. Even so, the
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, regardless of the sen-
tence imposed, can be far-reaching and devastating for some peo-
ple. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Argersinger
observed that "[tihe consequences of a misdemeanor conviction...
or the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label
'petty." 134 A few examples illustrate the point: loss of a driver's
license may be more serious than a "brief stay in jail,"135 so too
may be forfeiture of public office, disqualification from a profession
or loss of pension rights.
Conviction of even a misdemeanor can carry enormous and se-
vere consequences, particularly for a low-income or indigent de-
133. See id. at 40.
134. 407 U.S. 25, 47-48 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
135. Id. at 48. An excellent review of the consequences of a conviction is found
in Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970).
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fendant in an increasingly complex and regulated society. Loss of
eligibility for federally subsidized housing is one such consequence.
Federal regulations permit the manager or landlord to reject an
applicant with a history of criminal activity8 6 or for failure to
meet financial obligations stemming from a bad check or shoplift-
ing conviction. 137
These consequences, beyond the sentence of the court for mis-
demeanor violations, demonstrate the absolute necessity of ensur-
ing that misdemeanor trials, particularly for indigents, are fair
and that all of the rights of defendants at trial are preserved. An
increasingly complex and regulated society will continue to pro-
duce added and even unintended consequences for misdemeanor
convictions. It would not be far-fetched to conclude that due pro-
cess and judicial fairness require the appointment of counsel for
indigents even when imprisonment is neither a possibility, nor is it
imposed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems with Scott are inherent in its reliance on the
sentence imposed as the touchstone for the right of counsel for in-
digents. Scott loses sight of the purpose of counsel in the first
place, which is to ensure that the defendant has a fair trial. The
colonies' rejection of the harsh English rule in favor of granting
defendants the right to counsel in felonies was the first step in the
development of the law to keep pace with changes in society. Pow-
ell and Gideon are significant milestones in the journey towards
the goal of equal justice for all.
The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions have re-
jected Scott. They use the standard of authorized or potential pun-
ishment, not punishment actually imposed, to determine when
indigents are entitled to appointed counsel. As society changes,
other standards will be necessary to ensure that all persons are
afforded their constitutional rights. The New Jersey Supreme
Court may be leading the way with its holding that "simple justice"
requires that "no indigent defendant should be subjected to a con-
viction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of mag-
136. See 24 C.F.R. § 960.205(b)(3) (1999).
137. See id. § 960.205(b)(1).
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nitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have
counsel assigned without cost."138
138. Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (N.J. 1971) (emphasis added).

